Affiliation:
1. University of Missouri–Columbia; 113 Professional Building, Columbia, MO 65211, USA.
Abstract
I argue that the costs of entry, benefits of office and the probability of receiving electoral support, i.e. the strategic entry calculation by new party elites, determine new party emergence. The model is tested using pooled time-series cross-sectional data from 22 OECD countries for elections held between 1960 and 2002. The results show that new parties are more frequent when the institutional structures are permissive (the cost of entry is low), the corporatist arrangements are weak or non-existent (the benefit of entry is high) and the electoral histories of the incumbents are short (the probability of attracting votes is high). The last two factors interact in their relationship with the number of new parties, as presumed by the theory.
Subject
Sociology and Political Science
Cited by
171 articles.
订阅此论文施引文献
订阅此论文施引文献，注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献，订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献
1. Second phase: The activation stage;The Normalization of the Radical Right;2024-09-02
2. First phase: The latency equilibrium;The Normalization of the Radical Right;2024-09-02
3. Reported vote: An observational measure of political stigma;The Normalization of the Radical Right;2024-09-02
4. Dedication;The Normalization of the Radical Right;2024-09-02
5. Additional materials and analyses;The Normalization of the Radical Right;2024-09-02