First phase: The latency equilibrium

Abstract

Abstract How can social norms prevent the success of stigmatized political platforms, such as radical-right parties? This chapter argues that norms can bring about a latency equilibrium, where voters do not publicly express their support for radical-right platforms. This makes politicians underestimate latent support for radical-right parties, leaving those parties with worse leaders, who are unable to mobilize even voters who privately hold radical-right views. At the voter level, radical-right preferences are more costly to express. Consequently, radical-right voters often hide their views. At the politician level, radical-right parties typically have low-skilled leaders, but this is especially so when there are strong norms against radical-right views. Finally, the chapter shows how this equilibrium can be overcome. If individuals learn that there is more private support for their ideology than is typically observable, they become more willing to run for election.