An AOP-Based Fault Injection Environment for Cryptographic SystemC Designs

Abstract

The increasing complexity of cryptographic devices requires fast simulation environment in order to test their security against fault attacks. SystemC is one promising candidate in Electronic System Level that allows models to reach higher simulation speed. However in order to enable both fault injection and detection inside a SystemC cryptographic models, its code modification is mandatory. Aspect-Oriented Programming (AOP), which is a new programming paradigm, can be used to test the robustness of the cryptographic models without any code modifications. This may replace real cryptanalysis schemes. In this paper, we present a new methodology to simulate the security fault attacks of cryptographic systems at the Electronic System Level. A fault injection/detection environment is proposed to test the resistance of cryptographic SystemC models against fault injection attacks. The fault injection technique into cryptographic SystemC models is performed using weaving faults by AspectC++ as an AOP programming language. We validate our methodology with two scenarios applied to a SystemC Advanced Encryption Standard case study: the first is related to the impact of the AOP on fault detection capabilities, while the second refers to the impact of the AOP on simulation time and size of the executable files. Simulation results show that this methodology can evaluate perfectly the robustness of a cryptographic design against fault injection attacks. They show that the impact of AOP on simulation time is not significant.