Author:
Buchan Sarah A.,Tibebu Semra,Daneman Nick,Whelan Michael,Vanniyasingam Thuva,Murti Michelle,Brown Kevin A.
Abstract
AbstractIMPORTANCEHigher secondary attack rates related to variant of concern (VOC) index cases have been reported, but have not been explored within households, which continue to be an important source of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) transmissionOBJECTIVETo compare secondary attack rates in households with VOC versus non-VOC index cases.DESIGNA retrospective cohort study of household index cases reported from February 7 – 27, 2021. A propensity-score matched cohort was derived to calculate adjusted estimates.SETTINGOntario, Canada.PARTICIPANTSA population-based cohort of all private households with index cases. We excluded cases in congregate settings, as well as households with one individual or with >1 case with the same earliest symptom onset date.EXPOSUREVOC status, defined as either individuals confirmed as B.1.1.7 using whole genome sequencing or those that screened positive for the N501Y mutation using real-time PCR.MAIN OUTCOME AND MEASUREHousehold secondary attack rate, defined as the number of household secondary cases that occurred 1-14 days after the index case divided by the total number of household secondary contacts.RESULTSWe included 1,259 index VOC and non-VOC cases in the propensity score-matched analysis. The secondary attack rate for VOC index cases in this matched cohort was 1.31 times higher than non-VOC index cases (RR=1.31, 95%CI 1.14-1.49), similar to the unadjusted estimate. In stratified analyses, the higher secondary attack rate for VOC compared to non-VOC index cases was accentuated for asymptomatic index cases (RR=1.91, 95% CI 0.96-3.80) and presymptomatic cases (RR=3.41, 95%CI 1.13-10.26)CONCLUSIONS AND RELEVANCEThis study provides strong evidence of increased transmissibility in households due to VOCs and suggests that asymptomatic and pre-symptomatic transmission may be of particular importance for VOCs. Our study suggests that more aggressive public health measures will be needed to control VOCs and that ongoing research is needed to understand mechanisms of VOC transmissibility to curb their associated morbidity and mortality.
Publisher
Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory
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