The Smart Theory of Moral Responsibility and Desert

Abstract

Abstract The ‘Smart’ of my title is J. J.C. Smart. He has proposed an austere version of compatibilism.1 The generic doctrine of compatibilism holds that the claim—that all human choices are events in the physical world that are caused either deterministically or indeterministically—is compatible with moral responsibility and desert.2 According to Smart’s version, one is morally responsible for a choice one makes just in case praising or blaming, rewarding or punishing one for making the choice would produce good consequences by altering the future behavior of oneself or others. Compatibilism of this ilk does not include the assertion that free will and the causation of choices are compatible, and indeed Smart repudiates the libertarian idea of free will on the ground that it is logically incoherent and does not consider whether some watered-down notion of free will might make sense. If compatibilism plus determinism equals soft determinism, Smart’s doctrine merits the label ‘hard soft determinism’.