Standing

Abstract

Abstract This chapter examines standing to blame in an epistemic context. The primary focus is the so-called “business condition” on standing to blame. According to the business condition, standing is constrained by the extent to which the target of blame’s wrongdoing is the blamer’s business. The chapter examines an apparent tension between the business condition and the fact that it is not always clear whose business an epistemic failing is, and why. The relationship-based account is well positioned to make sense of this apparent tension. Careful attention to the issue is fruitful for a number of reasons. First, it provides a useful angle for exploring what entitles us to the normative expectations partially constituting our epistemic relationships. Second, it allows us to develop detailed answers to questions about the variable strength of epistemic blame, and its interaction with other normative domains. The chapter closes with a discussion of epistemic hypocrisy and complicity.