Abstract
Abstract
By linking the motivational component of epistemic blame to relationship modification, the relationship-based account can tell us something deeper about the nature of epistemic blame than the previous accounts. The chapter defends this claim in three main stages. First, it is argued that epistemic relationship modification can account for epistemic blame’s significance. Second, it is argued that epistemic relationship modification is at home in the epistemic domain. Third, the chapter advertises some further advantages of the account over its competitors, and responds to the most pressing remaining objections—including appeals to cool blame, self-blame, and blame of the dead and distant. This completes the argument that the relationship-based account can resolve the puzzle of epistemic blame.
Publisher
Oxford University PressOxford
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