Blameworthy Belief, Assertion, and Other Epistemic Harms

Abstract

Abstract This chapter examines the scope of appropriate epistemic blame. What would a complete list of behaviors and attitudes for which people can be epistemically blameworthy look like? The chapter begins by examining whether people can be epistemically blameworthy for things like dogmatism and wishful thinking. One concern about this is the well-worn question of whether people can be blameworthy for doxastic states which seem beyond their control. The relationship-based account is deployed to make sense of epistemic blame for attitudes that are not under direct voluntary control. The chapter turns its attention to assertion, testimonial injustice, and other forms of “epistemic harm,” such as epistemic exploitation and gaslighting. Important challenges arise when examining epistemic blameworthiness in each case. The chapter’s main aim is to argue that epistemic relationships are a useful tool for illuminating the nature of a wide variety of failings, and illustrating their connection to epistemic blame.