Abstract
AbstractIn recent publications we have drawn attention to the fact that if the dynamics of a model is structurally unstable, then the presence of structural model error places in-principle limits on the model’s ability to generate decision-relevant probability forecasts. Writing with a varying array of co-authors, Eric Winsberg has now produced at least four publications in which he dismisses our points as unfounded; the most recent of these appeared in this journal. In this paper we respond to the arguments of Winsberg and his co-workers, and we point out that their criticisms fail. We take this as an opportunity to restate and explain our arguments, and to point to fruitful directions for future research.
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Subject
History and Philosophy of Science,Philosophy
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