Abstract
A piece of folklore enjoys some currency among philosophical Bayesians, according to which Bayesian agents who, intuitively speaking, spread their credence over the entire space of available hypotheses are certain to converge to the truth. The goals of the current discussion are to show that that kernel of truth in this folklore is in some ways fairly small and to argue that Bayesian convergence-to-the-truth results are a liability for Bayesianism as an account of rationality since they render a certain sort of arrogance rationally mandatory.
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Subject
History and Philosophy of Science,Philosophy,History
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