Author:
Cisewski Jessi,Kadane Joseph B.,Schervish Mark J.,Seidenfeld Teddy,Stern Rafael
Abstract
Gordon Belot argues that Bayesian theory is epistemologically immodest. In response, we show that the topological conditions that underpin his criticisms of asymptotic Bayesian conditioning are self-defeating. They require extreme a priori credences regarding, for example, the limiting behavior of observed relative frequencies. We offer a different explication of Bayesian modesty using a goal of consensus: rival scientific opinions should be responsive to new facts as a way to resolve their disputes. Also we address Adam Elga’s rebuttal to Belot’s analysis, which focuses attention on the role that the assumption of countable additivity plays in Belot’s criticisms.
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Subject
History and Philosophy of Science,Philosophy,History
Cited by
8 articles.
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