Bribe-Switching-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Bribe-Switching

Published:2024-04-28 Issue: Volume: Page:
ISSN:1091-1421
Container-title:Public Finance Review
language:en
Short-container-title:Public Finance Review

Author:

Bologna Pavlik Jamie¹^ORCID,Desierto Desiree²

Affiliation:

1. Agricultural and Applied Economics, Texas Tech University, Lubbock, TX, USA

2. Department of Economics, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA, USA

Abstract

The US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) prohibits the payment of bribes to foreign public officials. We uncover an unintended consequence—the shadow economies of the countries of these officials increase after FCPA enforcement. Our hypothesis is that corrupt officials may be switching to taking bribes from illegal markets. We find that one case of FCPA enforcement alone increases the shadow economy by as much as 0.27 percentage points (pp), tree loss—an indicator of illegal logging—by 0.027 pp, and trade misinvoicing by 0.5 pp. Our results suggest the need to harmonize anti-corruption policies across all sectors—legal and illegal.

Publisher

SAGE Publications

Link

https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/10911421241248719

Reference45 articles.

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