1. Denyer N. , ‘The Origins of Justice’, 133–52; and now the work of Long A. A. (‘Pleasure and Social Utility - the virtues of being Epicurean’, Entretiens sur Tantiquite classiqw32 [1986], 283–329) and of P. Mitsis (see infra,n. 80), which was not available to me at the time of writing. Long does not consider the problem of the wise man′s justice, but his wide-ranging discussion of the relation between Epicurus′ doctrine of pleasure and his social philosophy is largely compatible with, and provides additional support for, the interpretation advanced herein (for our most important difference, see infra,n. 54). The main texts for Epicurus′ teaching on justice are KD5, 17, 31–8; Ep. ad Men.132; SV7, 51, 70 and F519, F53O–4 (fragments are cited according to H. Usener, Epicurea[Leipzig, 1887]), which should be supplemented by Hermarchus′ account of the Epicurean genealogy of morals ap.Porphyry, De Abst.1.7–12 ( = F24 in
2. On katastematic pleasure see Rist (supra[n. 14], 102–22, 170–2). There is a challenging and thoughtful discussion in J. Gosling and C. Taylor, The Greeks on Pleasure(Oxford, 1982), 365–96, but I am not persuaded by their attempt to banish the distinction between katastematic and kinetic pleasure from Epicurus' thought: they do not seem to me justified in rejecting Cicero's unequivocal evidence or the traditional interpretation of D. L. 10.136. My argument in this essay does not require that Cicero's understanding of katastematic pleasure be correct, although it does require that De Fin.2.28 be an accurate report of Epicurus' line of argument.
3. Horace here is contradicting the Stoic view according to which nee solum ius el iniuria natura dividicatur, sed omnino omnia honesta et turpia(Cic. De Leg.1.44); for his use of Epicurean doctrine in this Satiresee Goldschmidt (supra[n. 1], 150–65).
4. The sceptic's two kinds of assent and the question of the possibility of knowledge