Abstract
'Some beliefs about the world are justified, others are not.’ This seems to be a plausible, even if not completely uncontroversial, claim. The controversy most likely would center on the meaning given to the term ‘justified'. If one gives extremely strong criteria for justification, one might argue that the claim is false. None of our beliefs about the world are justified. It is possible, perhaps, to interpret Hume as taking such a position.Whether or not Hume held this, I think that there is a sense of ‘justified’ in which Hume could have argued that some of our beliefs about the world are justified. I will try to show this by developing an analysis of justified belief that is compatible with Hume's theory of the nature of beliefs and belief formation. As a minimum criterion for success such an analysis must be able to provide a plausible basis for distinguishing between justified and unjustified beliefs.
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Cited by
7 articles.
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1. Has Philosophy Failed?;Theoria;2022-02
2. Hume and reliabilism;Belgrade Philosophical Annual;2021
3. David Hume et les règles générales;Varia;2020-06-29
4. Hume's Epistemology: The State of the Question;The Southern Journal of Philosophy;2019-09
5. Hume on Education;Pacific Philosophical Quarterly;2017-04-26