1. Audi, R. (2008). Rational disagreement as a challenge to practical ethics and moral theory: An essay in moral epistemology. In Q. Smith (Ed.), Epistemology: New essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
2. Boyd, R. (1988). How to be a moral realist. In G. Sayre-McCord (Ed.), Essays on moral realism (pp. 181–228). Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
3. Bloomfield, P. (2008). Disagreement about disagreement. In W. Sinnott-Armstrong (Ed.), Moral psychology, Vol. 2. The cognitive science of morality: Intuition and diversity (pp. 303–331). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
4. Brink, D. (1984). Moral realism and the sceptical arguments from disagreement and queerness. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 62(2), 111–125.
5. Brink, D. (1989). Moral realism and the foundations of ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.