The Argument from Moral Responsibility

Abstract

Abstract Of the philosophers who are skeptical of the existence of moral responsibility, many remain optimistic that morality could carry on healthily with all reference to responsibility abolished. This chapter casts doubt on this optimism. Various arguments against moral responsibility are briefly outlined and accepted for the sake of argument to succeed. The chapter examines the effect that skepticism about moral responsibility should have on other kinds of moral judgment, such as axiological judgments (good and bad), deontological judgments (obligatory and permissible), and aretaic judgments (virtue and vice). Consideration is also given to what the abolition of responsibility would mean for the practices of apologizing and forgiving and for the emotion of guilt. It is concluded that the abolition of moral responsibility would have a far-reaching impact throughout the rest of moral discourse, such that being an error theorist about responsibility commits one to a more general moral error theory.