Some pupils should know better (because there is better knowledge than opinion). Interim findings from an empirical study of pupils’ and teachers’ understandings of knowledge and big questions in Religious Education

Abstract

AbstractIn this paper, we draw on interim findings of our research project on Religious Education (RE), knowledge and big questions. We have found Miranda Fricker’s concept of epistemic injustice useful in our analysis—that is, the notion that a person can be wronged “specifically in their capacity as a knower (Fricker 2007, 1). In interviews with Key Stage 3 pupils (aged 12–14) we found that for many pupils, their capacity to know was hindered by the prioritisation of respect for opinion. Where opinion is considered something not to be questioned, this seems to be a key indicator of epistemic disadvantage while some pupils valued and could employ criticality when considering knowledge claims (including opinions). Epistemic advantage in this way exacerbates epistemic injustice, broadening a gap between the epistemic haves and have-nots. This research is part of a larger project where we attempt to answer the question: ‘Does Religious Education have a distinctive contribution to make to the development of epistemic literacy?’. We begin with our account of epistemic literacy underpinned by Young’s powerful knowledge (Young and Muller 2010) and contextualise our data with discourses about knowledge and school education. We focus largely on the emergent theme of (respect for) opinions and we argue that the prioritisation of respect in RE is (for some pupils) a barrier to knowledge. We go on to explore why this matters for individuals, society and RE.