Intuitions, Counter-Examples, and Experimental Philosophy-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Intuitions, Counter-Examples, and Experimental Philosophy

Published:2010-03-19 Issue:3 Volume:1 Page:447-460
ISSN:1878-5158
Container-title:Review of Philosophy and Psychology
language:en
Short-container-title:Rev.Phil.Psych.

Author:

Deutsch Max

Publisher

Springer Science and Business Media LLC

Subject

Philosophy,Experimental and Cognitive Psychology

Link

http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s13164-010-0033-0.pdf

Reference28 articles.

1. Bealer, G. 1998. Intuition and the autonomy of philosophy. In Rethinking intuition: the psychology of intuition and its role in philosophical inquiry, ed. M. DePaul and W. Ramsey, 201–39. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.

2. Devitt, M. Experimental semantics. ms.

3. Engel, M. 1992. Is epistemic luck compatible with knowledge? Southern Journal of Philosophy 30: 59–75.

4. Gettier, E. 1963. Is justified true belief knowledge? Analysis 23: 121–123.

5. Goldman, A., and J. Pust. 1998. Philosophical theory and intuitional evidence. In Rethinking intuition: the psychology of intuition and its role in philosophical inquiry, ed. M. DePaul and W. Ramsey, 179–200. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.

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