The Philosophical Personality Argument

Abstract

AbstractThe philosophical heart of this book is embodied in the Philosophical Personality Argument, which is: Philosophically relevant intuitions are used as some evidence for the truth of some philosophical claims. Some differences in philosophically relevant intuitions used as evidence for the truth of some philosophical claims are systematically related to some differences in personality. If philosophically relevant intuitions are used as some evidence for the truth of some philosophical claims and those intuitions are systematically related to some differences in personality, then one’s endorsement of some philosophical claims is at least partially a function of one’s personality. Therefore, one’s endorsement of some philosophical claims is at least partially a function of one’s personality. In this chapter, we provide reasons to think (1) is true. We review evidence from Chaps. 2–4 providing reasons to think (2) is true. We discuss how premise (3) seems to capture standard ways that intuitions could be used as evidence. We then argue that the conclusion (4) poses substantial challenges to some philosophical projects (e.g., Neo-Platonic projects) but not necessarily others (e.g., conceptual analysis). We then defend premises 1–3 from several objections.