Abstract
AbstractThis contribution examines Miscevic’s defence against restrictionist X-phi, based on his view that thought experiments exhibit a large number of typical stages. On Miscevic’s view, the epistemic threats identified by proponents of the negative program in X-phi may be countered or ameliorated in various ways at various stages. I argue that the defence he offers is insufficient to counter the arguments by in particular Machery.
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
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