Author:
Cooke William N.,Mishra Aneil K.,Spreitzer Gretchen M.,Tschirhart Mary
Abstract
The authors develop a model of NLRB decision-making that, unlike the models employed in previous studies, distinguishes between decision-making in more important, complex cases and less important, simpler cases. Using a representative sample of Board decisions over 1957–86, they find that in deciding the minority (20%) of disputes that were particularly important or complex, Board members were influenced by their personal preferences and those of Presidents who appointed them—a finding consistent with the results of previous studies. In the remaining cases (about 80%), however, Board members were influenced in their decisions by little more than the recommendations of regional offices and administrative law judges. Another finding that substantially modifies the conclusions of earlier studies is that Board members appear to have been highly influenced by their accountability to the public when deciding more important, complex cases.
Subject
Management of Technology and Innovation,Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management,Strategy and Management
Cited by
10 articles.
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