Do bureaucratic appointees change their minds? Preference stability at the NLRB

Abstract

ObjectivesQuestions of attitude stability for appointed decisionmakers are vital to our understanding of democracy. I test the assumption of bureaucratic preference stability that is widespread in formal and empirical analyses of the U.S. executive branch.MethodsThe study presents a qualitative analysis of quantitative voting data for members of the National Labor Relations Board from 1948 to 1988ResultsAnalysis reveals a few clear cases of permanent and important preference change and some evidence of change at the very beginning or very end of a few board members' careers. But overall there is remarkable stability in the relative levels of support for labor exhibited by board members as their careers unfold.ConclusionsWith some notable exceptions, an independent regulatory board member's revealed preferences tend to remain stable and consistent with the expectations that any observer would have had at the time of their initial appointment.