Affiliation:
1. Washington State University
2. California Institute of Technology
Abstract
A growing literature on leagues composed of owners maximizing winning percentage shows that particular league rules have different impacts compared with leagues composed of profit-maximizing owners. But the underlying question of how to distinguish between the two types of leagues has received no treatment. In this article, we show that the two types of leagues can be distinguished in the talent market. A league of winning-percentage-maximizing owners will have higher talent costs and greater demand for talent. But, and perhaps more important, the level of competitive balance between the two types of leagues is indeterminate. In addition, a new policy instrument is suggested, namely, nudging owners toward one or the other objective, depending upon the particular locations of the demand for talent if owners pursue profits or winning percentage.
Subject
Economics, Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous)
Cited by
65 articles.
订阅此论文施引文献
订阅此论文施引文献,注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献,订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献