Bureaucratic Rationality and Nodal Agency in a Developmental State

Abstract

Theorists in the sociology of development have extensively discussed the capacity of a developmental state to intervene in the industrialization process of a nation. Evans argued that state capacity could be enhanced through the securing of internal cohesiveness, for which the establishment of an effective, rule-following bureaucracy was the key. Chibber amended Evans’s view by arguing that bureaucratic rationality would lead to state cohesiveness only in the presence of disciplinary coordination by a ‘nodal agency’ which was endowed with power over other state agencies that might compete for scarce resources for national development. Based on a study of the state-led biotech development in Singapore, the author of this article makes two further amendments. First, a nodal agency, as shown by the Economic Development Board of Singapore, can maximize the coordination of industrial and technology policy by maintaining an interlocking directorship with other state agencies and externalizing its culture rather than exercising coercion over other state agencies. Second, bureaucratic rationality in the presence of a powerful nodal agency can be a double-edged sword that enables and inhibits technological development.