The philosophy of personal epistemology

Abstract

In higher education, personal epistemology is today a significant research area. Personal epistemology has been seen as promising particularly because it focuses on one of the general learning aims of many contemporary universities, namely, the development of students’ creative and critical thinking. The article identifies serious conceptual problems in the theoretical framework of personal epistemology. First, we argue – contrary to many promoters of personal epistemology – that personal epistemology’s theoretical models are not based merely on empirical data from developmental psychology, but clearly feature normative philosophical elements. Second, we consider the acceptance of relativism in the theoretical framework of personal epistemology. We argue that the concept of fallibilism has been overlooked, which has forced personal epistemology theorists to choose between naïve realism and relativism. Their choice of relativism has led – in addition to other philosophical problems – to a loss of adequate definitions for the epistemological notions of objectivity and certainty. The recognition of epistemological fallibilism would be beneficial both to personal epistemology’s theoretical framework and to personal epistemology–based university pedagogy.