The limits of derisking. (Un)conditionality in the European green transformation

Abstract

The ecological transformation of the economy is frequently approached politically with market-based policy, in particular derisking, which attempts to steer private financial actors into ecological and climate sustainability by taking on risks. To understand the effects of such approaches, I point to the relational and concrete dynamics that unfold between states and finance. Conceptually, I propose analyzing the investment chains that surround these programs, and the conditionalities that constitute its relations, which I read as manifestations of infrastructural power. I argue that conditionalities are the qualifier of the transformative potential of market-based policy programs. The proposed “micro-financial” analysis allows to unpack the inherent limitations of derisking-based governance approaches. These approaches come with a dependence on financial intermediaries, which results in weak conditionality and enforcement. Concretely, I analyze how under BlueInvest, a pilot within the European Green Deal (EGD), the European Commission (EC) mandates the European Investment Fund (EIF) to harness venture capital (VC) funds in order to foster the blue economy. I show how, as a consequence of investors’ intermediary position in derisking-based operations and the EIF’s profitability orientation, policymakers come to depend on venture capitalists, hindering strong and effective conditionality and hardwiring limited sustainability effects into the investment chain.