Positivist Victimology: A Critique

Abstract

This article traces the development of two main theoretical accounts of victimisation. The first of its two parts is an intellectual history of positivist victimology. In its attempt to define victimisation by an examination of those held to be victims, positivist victimology has traditionally pursued three major concerns: the identification of factors in individuals or their environment that conduce to a non-random risk of victimisation, a concentration on inter-personal crimes of violence, and the identification of victims who may be held to have contributed to their victimisation. The article argues that each of these concerns suffers from serious difficulties which have inevitably limited the potential of positivist victimology to explain the everyday social process of identifying and responding to victimising events. The second part argues that this process performs a central role in social life; it is a principal means by which societies maintain their values and identify the limits of non-compliance with them. Critical victimology argues that as the process of labelling individuals as victims involves a statement of values, it is essential to analyse how, when and why some who sustain injury are labelled victims, and others not. The article draws on work within social psychology to explain the main parameters of these decisions.