How presidents push, when presidents win: A model of positive presidential power in US lawmaking

Abstract

Presidents’ positive role in US lawmaking is as ubiquitous as it is unclear. While a rich literature has identified many macro-level factors that constrain presidents’ policymaking potential, still unanswered is Richard Neustadt’s micro-level question: how can presidents influence legislation given the context and Congress they happen to inherit? Developing a game theoretic model in which the president allocates scarce ‘political capital’ to induce changes in legislators’ behavior, we deduce two lobbying strategies that White House officials may execute and, in turn, examine their impact on the laws that result. Comparative statics analysis not only shows how presidents can best target their persuasive arsenal, but further specifies the factors that condition those efforts’ effectiveness. Interestingly, results show that standard roll-call-based tests likely underestimate presidents’ legislative impact. We thus conclude by reconsidering the practice and potential of presidential leadership in national policymaking.