Friends and Foes of Theory Construction in Psychological Science

Abstract

Newell (1973) criticized the use of vague theoretical dichotomies to account for narrowly defined empirical phenomena. Many of the problems raised by Newell persist today. We argue that these problems derive not from any peculiarity of psychological science but from the hindrances inherent to empirical theory testing. To show the contemporary relevance of these problems, we present two modern illustrations of the encumbrances faced by dichotomy-based research, we review some attempts to rely on nonempirical criteria to overcome the empirical impediments in theory testing, and we bring the question of theoretical mimicry to bear on these problems. Next, we discuss an alternative to theoretical dichotomies: the Unified Theories of Cognition (Newell, 1990). Finally, we introduce the “new experimentalism” approach in philosophy of science (Mayo, 1996), which provides a new perspective on theory construction in psychological science. We conclude with suggestions on how this new perspective can be implemented.