Regime Changes, Neighborhoods, and Interstate Conflict, 1816-1992

Abstract

This article investigates whether a new political regime's institutional type and the political composition of its geographic neighborhood influence patterns of intraneighborhood militarized conflict. An event count model is used to analyze data on 360 new political regimes. Variables assess attributes of each new regime's geographic neighborhood, including size, political composition, stability, the presence of alliances, the presence of major powers, the distribution of capability, and the frequency of militarized disputes initiated by and against new regimes. Results show evidence of an interactive relationship between a new regime's type, the political composition of its neighborhood, and militarized disputes. However, independent of the political composition of their neighborhoods, new democratic regimes are less likely to initiate disputes against neighboring states. Furthermore, an inverted U-shaped relationship obtains between the degree of democracy in a neighborhood and the rate at which new regimes initiate disputes against neighboring states. The coherency of regimes in a neighborhood, rather than their type, may play an important role in subsequent patterns of conflict.