Affiliation:
1. School of Business Administration, George Mason University
Abstract
A decision maker must select one of a set of alternatives. The payoff will depend upon the state chosen by a malevolent opponent. This opponent might use deception to cause the decision maker to misperceive the likelihood that the specific state was chosen. The value of this deception is defined in terms of the payoff matrix and these misperceived likelihoods. An example, based on a simplified description of the deception planning surrounding the Normandy invasion in 1944 is included to illustrate the concepts.
Subject
Political Science and International Relations,Sociology and Political Science,General Business, Management and Accounting
Cited by
19 articles.
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