Misinformation and Disinformation in Modern Warfare

Abstract

Assessing Distorted Information in Modern Warfare Distorted information (misinformation and disinformation) has long been a part of warfare (see the writings of Sun-Tzu). However, the study of the ever-increasing use of distorted information in modern warfare has been rather limited. In “Misinformation and Disinformation in Modern Warfare,” Chang, Keblis, Li, Iakovou, and White model instances of today’s battlespace as a partially observable game with three agents, a leader and two followers, and examine the benefit to the leader (e.g., a military command) of modulating the communication of information between (i) followers who are adversaries and (ii) followers who are allies. Counter to intuition, the study shows that only under certain conditions is it optimal for the leader to degrade (enhance) the quality of the information communicated between adversarial (allied) followers. The developed methodology is applied to warfare instances encountered in the Battle of Mosul.