Adjudication without Enforcement in GATT Disputes

Author:

Reinhardt Eric1

Affiliation:

1. Department of Political Science, Emory University

Abstract

Disputes under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) exhibit a puzzling selection effect. Defendants concede more prior to GATT judgments than afterward, despite GATT's lack of enforcement power. Yet, why would states plea-bargain if they know they can spurn contrary rulings? To find out, the article develops an incomplete information model of trade bargaining with the option of adjudication. The plaintiff has greater resolve prior to a ruling, believing that the defendant might be compelled to concede to an adverse judgment—even if that belief later proves false. Surprisingly, this resolve induces more generous settlements even from defendants who intend not to comply with any ruling. After a ruling, however, this anticipatory effect is irrelevant: adjudication works best when threatened but not realized. The prospect of adjudication thus conditions the behavior of states even when enforcement is not forthcoming but not through mechanisms identified by previous studies.

Publisher

SAGE Publications

Subject

Political Science and International Relations,Sociology and Political Science,General Business, Management and Accounting

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