Affiliation:
1. F. Wendell Miller Professor of Political Science, University of Iowa Iowa City, IA USA
2. Professor of International Affairs, Josiah Meigs Distinguished Teaching Professor, Department of International Affairs, University of Georgia Athens, GA USA
Abstract
Abstract
In a previous article, we theorised that courts cast a shadow that changes the bargaining behaviour of potential litigant States. When two States prefer the same judicial forum under Article 287 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC), they have fewer maritime disputes, more peaceful negotiations, and less need for judicial dispute settlement. This article elaborates on several aspects of our argument including (i) differences in legal and social science perspectives, (ii) generalizability to other courts and regions, (iii) the clarity of judicial decisions, (iv) whether accepting the same judicial forum through Article 287 declarations matters, (v) conflict management as a process, (vi) how domestic legal traditions influence Article 287 declarations, and (vii) the possibility of selection or heterogeneous effects. Our discussion helps to address some of the criticisms raised in the AJIL Unbound (2021) forum on our article and presents avenues for future analyses.
Subject
Law,Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law,General Environmental Science,Geography, Planning and Development,Oceanography