The Forced Turnover Effect on an Overconfident CEO: Evidence From Taiwan-Listed Firms

Abstract

This research focuses on investigating the reasons why an overconfident chief executive officer (CEO) is forced to leave by examining CEO turnover observations from 463 Taiwan-listed companies over the period 2008 to 2016 and using the Cox semi-parametric proportional hazard model to test the reasons for CEOs being laid off. The empirical result shows that overconfidence increases a CEO’s forced turnover risk, but this risk is not significant for an overconfident CEO in a company with a high proportion of controlling shareholders on the board. In addition, an overconfident CEO’s forced turnover risk decreases when he/she has strong business and management ability. This paper contributes to the literature by demonstrating the relationship between a CEO’s forced turnover risk and control-affiliated directors as well as the CEO’s ability.