Political and economic accountability in a delegative democracy

Abstract

Recently, economic accountability theory as a means by which to hold political leaders accountable in the industrialized world has been generalized in transitional democracies. The theory advances how mass publics in young democracies evaluate and assess the performance of chief executives based on sociotropic or pocketbook economic evaluations and the occurrence of pivotal political events. The study finds that self-placement on poverty among Filipinos and primordial assessments of hunger are predictors of presidential approval. Pivotal political events involving attempted coups, corrupt practices and executive level malfeasance are not likely to affect presidential approval ratings over time. Furthermore, changes in the national economy have no association with Philippine presidential approval ratings from 1986–2009. The results of the study suggest that political and economic theories of accountability as applied to the developing world should be reassessed by taking into account the non-institutionalization of party systems, strong executive structures, and the politics of personalism, patronage and patrimonialism.