ON THE CHACTERISTIC NUMBERS OF VOTING GAMES-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

ON THE CHACTERISTIC NUMBERS OF VOTING GAMES

Published:2006-12 Issue:04 Volume:08 Page:643-654
ISSN:0219-1989
Container-title:International Game Theory Review
language:en
Short-container-title:Int. Game Theory Rev.

Author:

MARTIN MATHIEU¹,MERLIN VINCENT²

Affiliation:

1. THEMA, Departments of Economics, Université de Cergy Pontoise, 33 Boulevard du Port, 95011 Cergy Pontoise cedex, France

2. CREM, CNRS and University of Caen, Faculté de Sciences Economiques et de Gestion, 19 rue Claude Bloch, 14032 Caen Cedex, France

Abstract

This paper deals with the non-emptiness of the stability set for any proper voting game. We present an upper bound on the number of alternatives which guarantees the non emptiness of this solution concept. We show that this bound is greater than or equal to the one given by Le Breton and Salles (1990) for quota games.

Publisher

World Scientific Pub Co Pte Lt

Subject

Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty,Business and International Management,General Computer Science

Link

https://www.worldscientific.com/doi/pdf/10.1142/S0219198906001156

Reference13 articles.

1. On a class of rational social decision procedures

2. Consistent Majority Rules over Compact Sets of Alternatives

3. On some combinatorial problems arising in the theory of voting games

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2. Preference aggregation theory without acyclicity: The core without majority dissatisfaction;Games and Economic Behavior;2011-05

3. A core of voting games with improved foresight;Mathematical Social Sciences;2009-09