SOCIAL CHOICE AND COOPERATIVE GAME THEORY: VOTING GAMES AS SOCIAL AGGREGATION FUNCTIONS-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

SOCIAL CHOICE AND COOPERATIVE GAME THEORY: VOTING GAMES AS SOCIAL AGGREGATION FUNCTIONS

Published:2013-07-29 Issue:03 Volume:15 Page:1340012
ISSN:0219-1989
Container-title:International Game Theory Review
language:en
Short-container-title:Int. Game Theory Rev.

Author:

MARTIN MATHIEU¹,SALLES MAURICE²³⁴

Affiliation:

1. THEMA, University of Cergy-Pontoise, 95000 Cergy-Pontoise, France

2. CREM (UMR-CNRS 6211) and Institute for SCW, University of Caen, 14032 Caen cedex, France

3. CPNSS, London School of Economics, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AB, UK

4. Murat Sertel Center for Advanced Economic Studies, Bilgi University, Istanbul, Turkey

Abstract

We consider voting games as procedures to aggregate individual preferences. We survey positive results on the nonemptiness of the core of voting games and explore other solutions concepts that are basic supersets of the core such as Rubinstein's stability set and two types of uncovered sets. We consider cases where the sets of alternatives are 'ordinary' sets, finite sets and infinite sets with possibly a topological structure.

Publisher

World Scientific Pub Co Pte Lt

Subject

Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty,Business and International Management,General Computer Science

Link

https://www.worldscientific.com/doi/pdf/10.1142/S0219198913400124

Reference69 articles.

1. Markets with a Continuum of Traders

2. Positive Political Theory I

3. Sophisticated voting outcomes and agenda control

4. Free triples, large indifference classes and the majority rule

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