Toward Robust Monitoring of Malicious Outbreaks

Author:

Tang Shaojie1ORCID,Liu Siyuan2ORCID,Han Xu3,Qiao Yu4

Affiliation:

1. Naveen Jindal School of Management, University of Texas at Dallas, Richardson, Texas 75080;

2. Smeal College of Business, Pennsylvania State University, University Park, Pennsylvania 16802;

3. Gabelli School of Business, Fordham University, New York, New York 10023;

4. Department of Computer Science, Nanjing University, Nanjing, Jiangsu Province 210093, China

Abstract

Recently, diffusion processes in social networks have attracted increasing attention within computer science, marketing science, social sciences, and political science. Although the majority of existing works focus on maximizing the reach of desirable diffusion processes, we are interested in deploying a group of monitors to detect malicious diffusion processes such as the spread of computer worms. In this work, we introduce and study the [Formula: see text]-Monitoring Game} on networks. Our game is composed of two parties an attacker and a defender. The attacker can launch an attack by distributing a limited number of seeds (i.e., virus) to the network. Under our [Formula: see text]-Monitoring Game, we say an attack is successful if and only if the following two conditions are satisfied: (1) the outbreak/propagation reaches at least α individuals without intervention, and (2) it has not been detected before reaching β individuals. Typically, we require that β is no larger than α in order to compensate the reaction delays after the outbreak has been detected. On the other end, the defender’s ultimate goal is to deploy a set of monitors in the network that can minimize attacker’s success ratio in the worst-case. (We also extend the basic model by considering a noisy diffusion model, where the propagation probabilities on each edge could vary within an interval.) Our work is built upon recent work in security games, our adversarial setting provides robust solutions in practice. Summary of Contribution: Although the diffusion processes in social networks have been extensively studied, most existing works aim at maximizing the reach of desirable diffusion processes. We are interested in deploying a group of monitors to detect malicious diffusion processes, such as the spread of computer worms. To capture the impact of model uncertainty, we consider a noisy diffusion model in which the propagation probabilities on each edge could vary within an interval. Our work is built upon recent work in security games; our adversarial setting leads to robust solutions in practice.

Publisher

Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS)

Subject

General Engineering

Reference15 articles.

1. COVERAGE: detecting and reacting to worm epidemics using cooperation and validation

2. Basilico N, Gatti N (2011) Automated abstractions for patrolling security games. AAAI Conf. Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), 1096–1101.

3. Influence Blocking Maximization in Social Networks under the Competitive Linear Threshold Model

4. Howard NJ (2010) Finding optimal strategies for influencing social networks in two player games. Unpublished PhD thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge.

Cited by 2 articles. 订阅此论文施引文献 订阅此论文施引文献,注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献,订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献

同舟云学术

1.学者识别学者识别

2.学术分析学术分析

3.人才评估人才评估

"同舟云学术"是以全球学者为主线,采集、加工和组织学术论文而形成的新型学术文献查询和分析系统,可以对全球学者进行文献检索和人才价值评估。用户可以通过关注某些学科领域的顶尖人物而持续追踪该领域的学科进展和研究前沿。经过近期的数据扩容,当前同舟云学术共收录了国内外主流学术期刊6万余种,收集的期刊论文及会议论文总量共计约1.5亿篇,并以每天添加12000余篇中外论文的速度递增。我们也可以为用户提供个性化、定制化的学者数据。欢迎来电咨询!咨询电话:010-8811{复制后删除}0370

www.globalauthorid.com

TOP

Copyright © 2019-2024 北京同舟云网络信息技术有限公司
京公网安备11010802033243号  京ICP备18003416号-3