The sensitivity of third party punishment to the framing effect and its brain mechanism

Abstract

AbstractPeople as third-party observers, without direct self-interest, may punish norm violators to maintain social norms. However, third-party judgment and the follow-up punishment might be susceptible to the way we frame (i.e., verbally describe) a norm violation. We conducted a behavioral and a neuroimaging experiment to investigate the above phenomenon, which we call “third-party framing effect.” In these experiments, participants observed an anonymous player A decided whether to retain her/his economic benefit while exposing player B to a risk of physical pain (described as “harming others” in one condition and “not helping others” in the other condition), then they had a chance to punish player A at their own cost. Participants were more willing to execute third-party punishment under the harm frame compared to the help frame, manifesting as a framing effect. Self-reported moral outrage toward player A mediated the relationship between empathy toward player B and the framing effect size. Correspondingly, the insula (possibly related to empathy) and cerebellum (possibly related to anger) were activated more strongly under the harm frame than the help frame. Functional connectivity between these regions showed strongest weight when predicting the framing effect size. These findings shed light on the psychological and neural mechanisms of the third-party framing effect.Graphic abstract