When Agency Priorities Matter: Risk Aversion for Autonomy and Turf Protection in Mandated Collaboration

Abstract

Abstract Most studies in collaborative governance examine system-level or agency-level drivers of the horizontal dimension of collaboration, that is, the specific forms of collaboration among an existing set of actors. Few have examined the vertical dimension, that is, what actors are involved and the scope of collaboration. This study examines the latter issue by studying the implementation of the California Sustainable Groundwater Management Act (SGMA), passed in 2014, mandating collaboration among local agencies. We theorize that when their core mission and key constituencies’ interests are at stake under a mandate, agencies focus on protecting organizational autonomy and bureaucratic turf in determining the scope of the collaborative arrangement, rendering other usual collaboration drivers less relevant. With data derived from administrative records and a statewide survey of local groundwater managers, we test this argument using several analytical methods, including probit regression, two-step estimation of an ordered probit selection model, and a linear probability model. The analyses consistently show that agencies are more likely to commit to regionally integrated collaboration that matches the scale of a groundwater basin if (1) their mission addresses a broader issue focus (lower issue specificity), (2) their core stakeholder groups have less concentrated interests, and (3) the organizational culture is less rigid and risk averse. In contrast, other well-known horizontal collaboration drivers do not matter. By unpacking the agency-specific sources of turf and reputation protection, this study contributes to an understanding of collaboration risk management.