Sweetening the Deal: The Strategic Value of Combining Inducements with Militarized Compellent Threats

Abstract

Abstract This study examines the impact of combining conditional inducements with threats in the context of militarized compellence. It introduces a novel variable to measure the presence of inducements and presents a theory and empirical tests supporting the hypothesis of an increased likelihood of successful outcomes when combining militarized compellent threats with inducements. This integration provides the target with a face-saving opportunity to exit impending militarized conflicts gracefully, and effectively signaling the coercer's sincere commitment and intention to bear associated implement costs. Statistical analysis addresses potential endogeneity and reveals a significant, positive association between inducement use and successful outcomes. Empirical evidence from a comprehensive statistical analysis underscores the effectiveness of adopting a simultaneous carrot-and-stick approach in militarized compellence. The result implies that perceived weaknesses linked to inducements can be mitigated by their combination with strong threats.