Affiliation:
1. University of Lincoln
2. Goethe University Frankfurt
3. UNSW Sydney and AGORA Centre for Market Design
4. University of Sydney
Abstract
Abstract
We study an agent’s incentives to discover where her talents lie before putting them to productive use. In our setting, an agent can specialize and learn about the same type of talent repeatedly, or experiment and learn about different types of talent. While experimentation is efficient for a range of distributions of talent and initial signals, labor-market institutions play a crucial role for individual incentives to experiment. Institutions that give the agent sufficiently large bargaining power, provide incentives for experimentation, but for weak bargaining power, agents specialize. We also look at how competition in the labor market, human capital accumulation, and correlation across talents affect incentives to experiment. (JEL codes: D83; J24; J42)
Funder
German Academic Exchange Service & Group of Eight
Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP)
Subject
Law,Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management,Economics and Econometrics
Reference27 articles.
1. “Career Concerns in Teams;Auriol;Journal of Labor Economics,2002
2. “Bertrand without Fudge;Blume;Economics Letters,2003
Cited by
1 articles.
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