It is a natural thought that if discerning some morally relevant factor would be exceptionally difficult, we are not to blame if we fail to recognize it. This chapter argues that difficulty per se does not shape the epistemic condition. According to the best account of difficulty, difficulty is a matter of exerting effort. All other apparent kinds of difficulty can be explained by this unified account. Further, there is no stock set of what we may call effort-requiring features. Importantly, some of these effort-requiring features mitigate blameworthiness, whereas others do not. Effort-requiring features that reflect badly on the agent, for example, mitigate blameworthiness to a lesser extent than those that do not. Difficulty itself does not actually mitigate blameworthiness. In cases where difficulty does appear to mitigate blameworthiness, it is either the effort-requiring features that do so, or it is overriding considerations lost through sacrifice of effort.