How Much Should a Person Know? Moral Inquiry & Demandingness

Author:

Hartford Anna1

Affiliation:

1. Department of Philosophy , Stellenbosch University , Private Bag X1 , Matieland 7602 , South Africa

Abstract

Abstract An area of consensus in debates about culpability for ignorance concerns the importance of an agent’s epistemic situation, and the information available to them, in determining what they ought to know. On this understanding, given the excesses of our present epistemic situation, we are more culpable for our morally-relevant ignorance than ever. This verdict often seems appropriate at the level of individual cases, but I argue that it is over-demanding when considered at large. On the other hand, when we describe an obligation to know that avoids over-demandingness at large, it fails to be sufficiently demanding in individual cases. The first half of this paper is dedicated to setting up this dilemma. In the second half, I show that it cannot be easily escaped. Finally, I suggest that this dilemma impedes our ability to morally appraise one another’s ignorance, and even our own.

Publisher

Walter de Gruyter GmbH

Subject

History and Philosophy of Science,Sociology and Political Science,Philosophy

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