Kant’s Derivation of the Moral “Ought” from a Metaphysical “Is”

Abstract

AbstractThis chapter argues that Kant can be read as holding that “ought” judgments follow from certain “is” judgments by mere analysis. More specifically, an interpretation is defended according to which (1) Kant holds that “S ought to F” is analytically equivalent to “If, as it can and would were there no other influences on the will, S’s faculty of reason determined S’s willing, S would F” and (2) Kant’s notions of reason, the will, and freedom are all fundamentally non-normative. Not only does this reading have significant textual support, but it also sheds light on why Kant takes freedom and morality to mutually imply one another. Moreover, while Kant does take there to be a gap between moral judgments and empirical descriptive statements, that gap is consistent with the analysis in question. The author concludes by arguing that this rejection of the is-ought gap is not as philosophically implausible as it might seem, with a focus on G. E. Moore and Hume’s arguments for certain “gaps” between the normative and the non-normative.