Reason

Abstract

AbstractIn this chapter, I focus on the form of cognition that reason in particular aims to achieve. In doing so, I begin with more familiar characterizations of reason in Kant as the capacity for inference and cognition from principles, before turning to a more neglected characterization: reason as the capacity for “comprehension” (Begreifen). This is a cognitive achievement that is roughly equivalent to what contemporary epistemologists have in mind with “understanding”, which Kant conceives of as insight or cognition from principles that is sufficient to our purposes. In the remainder of this chapter, I discuss the significance of this conception of reason’s aims, focusing on two issues. First, I discuss the significance of the fact that, unlike his rationalist predecessors, Kant conceives of reason as a capacity, not for rational insight full stop, but rather for comprehension. I argue that this is closely associated with Kant’s critical modesty about the reach of reason. But I also argue that this characterization of reason is significant for our understanding of the unity of theoretical and practical reason. Like cognition in general, comprehension comes in both a theoretical and a practical form. Thus, we can make use of the idea of reason as the capacity for comprehension to better understand the unity of reason, while also using Kant’s end- or purpose-relative conception of comprehension to explain his claims about the primacy of practical reason’s ends or interests.