Abstract
Abstract
`Choices can be wise or foolish, and feelings can be apt or off the mark.' Since this is how we judge, it would be good to know what content these normative judgements carry. Gibbard offers an answer, and elaborates it. His theory explores what is at issue in narrowly moral questions, and in questions of rational thought and conduct in general. It helps to explain why normative thought and talk so pervade human life, and why our highly social species might have evolved to be gripped by these questions. Gibbard asks how, if his theory is right, we can interpret our normative puzzles, and thus proceed toward finding answers to them. What claims to objectivity could we make for these answers, if once we had them? Gibbard maintains that normative philosophical inquiry is a refinement of a central human activity: working out in discussion how to live, and how to feel about things in our lives and in the lives of others. Not available from OUP in the USA, Canada or the Phillippines.
Publisher
Oxford University PressOxford
Cited by
118 articles.
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