Responsibility

Abstract

Abstract A creature sharing with its wider community a stable, confidently held normative outlook and adequately endowed with the capacity for rational self-governance is the sort of creature that it is fair and appropriate to hold responsible for its actions at least most of the time. Such a creature can take ownership of their values and the actions that flow from them, accepting the social contract by which they are to be held accountable for these. This involves a measure of risk but it is a risk it makes sense to accept given a sufficent measure of self-trust. Such a creature can legitimately be considered a responsible agent but it does not have, because nothing could have, the kind of ultimate responsibility some writers imagine we need. It cannot create itself from nothing. But we need do no such thing to be responsible agents. Our actions flow from the contingencies of who we are, normatively speaking. And that in turn flows from load of other stuff that happened long ago. But if we are nonetheless willing to take ownership of who we are then that is not such a big deal. The chapter also addresses the issue of how we can be justified in punishing those who fail to comply with our moral expectations of them and to recognize the reasons we think they have for doing so.