Affiliation:
1. University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
2. Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University
3. University of Colorado Denver and an IZA research fellow
Abstract
Abstract
Post-election violence is a common form of conflict, but its underlying mechanisms are not well understood. Using data from the 2007 Philippine mayoral elections, this paper provides evidence that post-election violence is particularly intense after narrow victories by incumbents. Using a density test, the study shows that incumbents were substantially more likely to win narrow victories than their challengers, a pattern consistent with electoral manipulation. There is no evidence that the increase in post-election violence is related to the incumbents’ political platform or their performance in past elections. These results provide support for the notion that post-election violence is triggered by election fraud or by the failure of democratic ways of removing unpopular incumbents from office.
Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP)
Subject
Economics and Econometrics,Finance,Development,Accounting
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